




















































































1　『Who filed the most PCT patent applications in 2019?』（2020）1 頁、世界知的所有権機関ホームページ（https://www.wipo.
int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_pct_2019.pd）（2020年 6 月 6 日現在）
2　特許庁『特許行政年次報告書2019年版〈統計・資料編〉』（特許庁、2019）18頁
3 　米国特許法では特許権侵害の成立要件に「業」要件は含まれていない。






























るためには直接侵害の存在が必要であるとの立場をとっている（寄与侵害については Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 





























































7　例えば、東京地判平成 6年 7月22日判タ854号84頁、東京地判平成19年 4 月24日裁判所 HP参照（平成17年（ワ）第
15327号）、東京地判平成19年12月26日裁判所 HP参照（平成17年（ワ）第23477号）、東京地判平成20年 3 月27日判1298号
269頁、東京地判平成23年 2 月24日裁判所 HP参照（平成20年（ワ）第2944号）。











12　例えば、大阪地判昭和36年 5 月 4 日判タ119号41頁、東京地判平成16年 8 月17日判タ1172号302頁、知財高裁平成27年


































































































































































































































弘之＝スティーブン バックマン「米国における共同侵害とその対応策」知財管理62巻 3 号（2012）265-272頁、北川純次
「日米における複数の主体が関与する特許権侵害の判断」特技懇275号（2014）53-63頁、小栗久典「米国特許法下におけ
る方法特許の共同侵害について」時々刻々1巻12号（2015）1-5頁、松尾直樹「知っておきたいソフトウェア特許関連判
決（その38）―米国における複数当事者による特許侵害訴訟（AKAMAI 事件最高裁判決）―」パテント68巻 2 号（2015）
77-81頁、谷田睦樹＝クリストファー ブライト「Akamai基準に基づき共同侵害の成否を判断した CAFC判決」知財管理
67巻10号（2017）1583-1594頁、紋谷崇俊「米国における複数関与者による特許権侵害の拡大傾向－Akamai判決後の分
割侵害（Divided Infringement）ないし共同侵害（Joint Infringement）の動向－」AIPPI63巻 7 号（2018）607-626頁がある。
40　BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373（2007）
41　前掲脚注40
42　CAFCが示した管理又は指示論自体は、特許権侵害訴訟において高裁レベルで古くから触れられている考え方である。
例えば、特許権侵害事件に関する1944年の控訴審（Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., 143 F.2d 1003（1944））において裁判所
は「特許侵害を目的として代理人を雇うか、または独立した請負業者に侵害品を製造させる者は、特許権侵害の責任を
負うことは明らかである」といったように、管理又は指示論に類似した考え方を示している。
43　原文該当箇所「A party cannot avoid infringement, however, simply by contracting out steps of a patented process to another 
entity. In those cases, the party in control would be liable for direct infringement. It would be unfair indeed for the mastermind in such 
























44　原文該当箇所「This court acknowledges that the standard requiring control or direction for a finding of joint infringement may in 
some circumstances allow parties to enter into arms-length agreements to avoid infringement. Nonetheless, this concern does not 
outweigh concerns over expanding the rules governing direct infringement. For example, expanding the rules governing direct 
infringement to reach independent conduct of multiple actors would subvert the statutory scheme for indirect infringement. Direct 
infringement is a strict-liability offense, but it is limited to those who practice each and every element of the claimed invention. By 
contrast, indirect liability requires evidence of “specific intent” to induce infringement. Another form of indirect infringement, 
contributory infringement under § 271 (c), also requires a mens rea (knowledge) and is limited to sales of components or materials 
without substantial noninfringing uses. Under BMC’s proposed approach, a patentee would rarely, if ever, need to bring a claim for 
indirect infringement.」
45　原文該当箇所「The concerns over a party avoiding infringement by arms-length cooperation can usually be offset by proper claim 
drafting. A patentee can usually structure a claim to capture infringement by a single party. See Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided 
Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 272-75 (2005). In this case, for example, BMC could have drafted its claims to focus on 
one entity. The steps of the claim might have featured references to a single party’s supplying or receiving each element of the claimed 
process. However, BMC chose instead to have four different parties perform different acts within one claim. BMC correctly notes the 
difficulty of proving infringement of this claim format. Nonetheless, this court will not unilaterally restructure the claim or the 
standards for joint infringement to remedy these ill-conceived claims.」
46　原文該当箇所「Applying these standards to BMC’s charges against Paymentech properly results in a finding of no infringement. 
Although BMC proffered evidence to establish some relationship between Paymentech and the debit networks, the magistrate and the 
district court both concluded that this evidence was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Paymentech 
controls or directs the activity of the debit networks. Specifically, the magistrate and district court found BMC’s evidence that 
Paymentech provides data (debit card number, name, amount of purchase, etc.) to the debit networks, absent any evidence that 
Paymentech also provides instructions or directions regarding the use of those data, to be inadequate. BMC argues that instructions or 
directions can be inferred from the provision of these data, or that the data themselves provide instructions or directions. But, having 
presented no evidence below to support either theory, BMC is not entitled to such an inference with respect to the debit networks that 
*1382 would allow it to survive summary judgment. The evidence before the magistrate and the district court to support direction or 
control of financial institutions by Paymentech was even scarcer. As the district court observed, the record contained no evidence even 
of a contractual relationship between Paymentech and the financial institutions.
　　Without this direction or control of both the debit networks and the financial institutions, Paymentech did not perform or cause to 
be performed each and every element of the claims. In this situation, neither the financial institutions, the debit networks, nor the 
payment services provider, Paymentech, bears responsibility for the actions of the other.」
























　Muniauction事件 CAFC判決から約 2年後、CAFCが新たに審理を行ったのが Golden Hour 事件52である。










48　原文該当箇所「In BMC Resources, this court clarified the proper standard for whether a method claim is directly infringed by the 
combined actions of multiple parties. The court’s analysis was founded on the proposition that direct infringement requires a single 
party to perform every step of a claimed method. …（中略）…Yet the court recognized a tension between this proposition and the 
well-settled rule that “a defendant cannot thus avoid liability for direct infringement by having someone else carry out one or more of 
the claimed steps on its behalf.” Id. at 1379. Accordingly, where the actions of multiple parties combine to perform every step of a 
claimed method, the claim is directly infringed only if one party exercises “control or direction” over the entire process such that 
every step is attributable to the controlling party, i.e., the “mastermind.”」
49　原文該当箇所「That Thomson controls access to its system and instructs bidders on its use is not sufficient to incur liability for 
direct infringement.」
50　原文該当箇所「Under BMC Resources, the control or direction standard is satisfied in situations where the law would traditionally 
hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed by another party that are required to complete performance 
of a claimed method.」
51　原文該当箇所「In this case, Thomson neither performed every step of the claimed methods nor had another party perform steps 
on its behalf, and Muniauction has identified no legal theory under which Thomson might be vicariously liable for the actions of the 
bidders. Therefore, Thomson does not infringe the asserted claims as a matter of law.」














件である。この Akamai事件はコンテンツ配信ネットワーク（Content Delivery Network（CDN））に関する















　本事件は訴訟の経緯が複雑であり、2009年 4 月に第 1審判決がなされた後、2010年12月の CAFC判決、
2012年 8 月の CAFC（大法廷）判決、2014年 6 月の連邦最高裁判所（以下、「最高裁」という。）判決、





53　原文該当箇所「Where the combined actions of multiple parties are alleged to infringe process claims, the patent holder must 
prove that one party exercised “control or direction” over the entire process such that all steps of the process can be attributed to the 
controlling party, i.e., the “mastermind.” Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing BMC 
Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Here, the district court concluded that the evidence of 
control or direction was insufficient as a matter of law to uphold a finding of joint infringement. We agree with the district court that 
the evidence here was insufficient for jury to infer control or direction. We see no need for extended discussion of this issue and we 
affirm the district court’s grant of JMOL as to the process claims the jury found to be jointly infringed (claims 15-22).」


















（イ）CAFC 大法廷判決（2012年 8 月）59








56　原文該当箇所「In this case, there is nothing to indicate that Limelight’s customers are performing any of the claimed method 
steps as agents for Limelight. To the contrary, Limelight’s CDN is a service similar to Thomson’s online auction system in 
Muniauction, and Limelight’s relationship with its customers is similar to Thomson’s relationship with the bidders. In both cases, 
customers are provided instructions on use of the service and are required to perform some steps of the claimed method to take 
advantage of that service. In Muniauction, the customers performed the step of bidding. Here, the customers decide what content, if 
any, they would like delivered by Limelight’s CDN and then perform the step of “tagging” that content. Limelight’s customers also 
perform the step of “serving” their own web pages.」
57　原 文 該 当 箇 所「As discussed above, Limelight’s customers decide what content, if any, they choose to have delivered by 
Limelight’s CDN and only then perform the “tagging” and “serving” steps. The form contract does not obligate Limelight’s customers 
to perform any of the method steps. It merely explains that the customer will have to perform the steps if it decides to take advantage 
of Limelight’s service. …（中略）… Limelight’s customers did not perform the actions of tagging and serving as Limelight’s agents 
and were not contractually obligated to perform those actions. Instead, the evidence leaves no question that Limelight’s customers 
acted principally for their own benefit and under their own control.」
58　原文該当箇所「Here, the asserted claims were drafted so as to require the activities of both Limelight and its customers for a 
finding of infringement. Thus, Akamai put itself in a position of having to show that the allegedly infringing activities of Limelight’s 
customers were attributable to Limelight. Akamai did not meet this burden because it did not show that Limelight’s customers were 
acting as agents of or were contractually obligated to Limelight when performing the tagging and serving steps. Thus, the district court 
properly granted JMOL of noninfringement to Limelight.」
59　Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight..., 692 F.3d 1301（2012） なお、上記（ア）の CAFC判決から約 4か月後に CAFCは
Akamai事件と同じく複数主体による特許権侵害が問題となったMcKesson事件（McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7531）においても同様の判断を示しており、本 CAFC大法廷判決では、McKesson事件も合わせて
審理されている。なお、McKesson事件は医療提供者と患者との電子的コミュニケーションに関する方法の特許（米国特
許6757898号）の権利者であるMcKesson Technologies Inc.が、医療提供者と患者との電子的コミュニケーションを実現す
るMyChartというソフトウェアを販売していた Epic Systems Corporationを誘引侵害で訴えた事件である。
60　原文該当箇所「Recent precedents of this court have interpreted section 271（b） to mean that unless the accused infringer directs 
or controls the actions of the party or parties that are performing the claimed steps, the patentee has no remedy, even though the patentee’s 
rights are plainly being violated by the actors’ joint conduct. We now conclude that this interpretation of section 271 (b) is wrong as a 
matter of statutory construction, precedent, and sound patent policy. …（中略）… In doing so, we reconsider and overrule the 2007 
decision of this court in which we held that in order for a party to be liable for induced infringement, some other single entity must be 
liable for direct infringement. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed.Cir.2007). To be clear, we hold that all the 
steps of a claimed method must be performed in order to find induced infringement, but that it is not necessary to prove that all the steps 























　Limelight社は先の CAFC大法廷判決（2012年 8 月）を不服として、最高裁に上告した。最高裁は本件
上告を受理し、米国特許法271条（a）項に基づく直接侵害を行う者が存在しなくとも、271条（b）項にお
61　原文該当箇所「Because direct infringement is a strict liability tort, it has been thought that extending liability in that manner 
would ensnare actors who did not themselves commit all the acts necessary to constitute infringement and who had no way of 
knowing that others were acting in a way that rendered their collective conduct infringing. …（中略）… For that reason, this court has 
rejected claims of liability for direct infringement of method claims in cases in which several parties have collectively committed the 
acts necessary to constitute direct infringement, but no single party has committed all of the required acts.…（中略）… To be sure, the 
court has recognized that direct infringement applies when the acts of infringement are committed by an agent of the accused infringer 
or a party acting pursuant to the accused infringer’s direction or control.」
62　原文該当箇所「Induced infringement is in some ways narrower than direct infringement and in some ways broader. Unlike direct 
infringement, induced infringement is not a strict liability tort; it requires that the accused inducer act with knowledge that the induced 
acts constitute patent infringement. …（中略）… An important limitation on the scope of induced infringement is that inducement 
gives rise to liability only if the inducement leads to actual infringement. That principle, that there can be no indirect infringement 
without direct infringement, is well settled. …（中略）… Requiring proof that there has been direct infringement as a predicate for 
induced infringement is not the same as requiring proof that a single party would be liable as a direct infringer. …（中略）… A party 
who knowingly induces others to engage in acts that collectively practice the steps of the patented method̶and those others perform 
those acts̶has had precisely the same impact on the patentee as a party who induces the same infringement by a single direct 
infringer; there is no reason, either in the text of the statute or in the policy underlying it, to treat the two inducers differently. …（中
略）… Rather, “infringement” in this context appears to refer most naturally to the acts necessary to infringe a patent, not to whether 
those acts are performed by one entity or several.」
63　判決文のセクション Cを参照。
64　判決文のセクション Dを参照。
65　原文該当箇所「In the Akamai case, although the jury found that the content providers acted under Limelight’s direction and 
control, the trial court correctly held that Limelight did not direct and control the actions of the content providers as those terms have 
been used in this court’s direct infringement cases. Notwithstanding that ruling, under the principles of inducement laid out above, 
Limelight would be liable for inducing infringement if the patentee could show that (1) Limelight knew of Akamai’s patent, (2) it 
performed all but one of the steps of the method claimed in the patent, (3) it induced the content providers to perform the final step of 
the claimed method, and (4) the content providers in fact performed that final step. …（中略）… While we do not hold that Akamai is 
entitled to prevail on its theory of direct infringement, the evidence could support a judgment in its favor on a theory of induced 
infringement.」






















67　Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) 本事件で問題となった特許発明（米国特許第2569724
号）はコンバーチブル自動車、いわゆるオープンカーに用いられる折り畳み可能な屋根（Convertible Folding Top with 
Automatic Seal at Rear Quarter）に関するものであり、特許権者である Convertible Top Replacement Co.（以下、「Convertible








68　原文該当箇所「Neither the Federal Circuit, see 692 F. 3d, at 1308, nor respondents, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 44, dispute the proposition 
that liability for inducement must be predicated on direct infringement. This is for good reason, as our case law leaves no doubt that 
inducement liability may arise “if, but only if, ［there is］ direct infringement.” Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 
U. S. 336, 341, 81 S. Ct. 599, 5 L. Ed. 2d 592, 1961 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 635 (1961) ).…（中略）… But the Federal Circuit reasoned that 
a defendant can be liable for inducing infringement under §271(b) even if no one has committed direct infringement within the terms 
of §271(a) (or any other provision of the patent laws), because direct infringement can exist independently of a violation of these 
statutory provisions. See 692 F. 3d, at 1314. …（中略）… The Federal Circuit held in Muniauction that a method’s steps have not all 
been performed as claimed by the patent unless they are all attributable to the same defendant, either because the defendant actually 
performed those steps or because he directed or controlled others who performed them. …（中略）… In that case the defendant has not 
encouraged infringement, but no principled reason prevents him from being held liable for inducement under the Federal Circuit’s 
reasoning, which permits inducement liability when fewer than all of a method’s steps have been performed within the meaning of the 
patent. The decision below would require the courts to develop two parallel bodies of infringement law： one for liability for direct 
infringement, and one for liability for inducement.」
69　Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972)
70　原文該当箇所「Section 271(f)(1) reinforces our reading of §271(b). That subsection imposes liability on a party who “supplies 
or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention...in such 
manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the 
patent if such combination occurred within the United States.” As this provision illustrates, when Congress wishes to impose liability 
for inducing activity that does not itself constitute direct infringement, it knows precisely how to do so. The courts should not create 
liability for inducement of noninfringing conduct where Congress has elected not to extend that concept.」
71　判決文のセクション II-Bを参照。
72　原文該当箇所「Finally, respondents, like the Federal Circuit, criticize our interpretation of §271 (b) as permitting a would-be 
infringer to evade liability by dividing performance of a method patent’s steps with another whom the defendant neither directs nor 
複数主体が関与する特許権侵害問題への米国判例からの示唆  （岡本）
15
　以上のことから、最高裁は先の CAFC大法廷判決（2012年 8 月）を破棄し、事件を差し戻したが、そ
の際に、CAFCが第271条（a）項の適用範囲を過度に狭めている可能性について触れつつ、CAFCに対し
て271条（a）項に関する問題について再考するよう示唆した73。








（オ）CAFC 大法廷判決（2015年 8 月）76












controls. We acknowledge this concern. Any such anomaly, however, would result from the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of §271 
(a) in Muniauction. A desire to avoid Muniauction’s natural consequences does not justify fundamentally altering the rules of 
inducement liability that the text and structure of the Patent Act clearly require̶an alteration that would result in its own serious and 
problematic consequences, namely, creating for §271 (b) purposes some freefloating concept of “infringement” both untethered to 
the statutory text and difficult for the lower courts to apply consistently.」
73　原文該当箇所「But the possibility that the Federal Circuit erred by too narrowly circumscribing the scope of §271 (a) is no 
reason for this Court to err a second time by misconstruing §271 (b) to impose liability for inducing infringement where no 
infringement has occurred. …（中略）… Our decision on the §271 (b) question necessitates a remand to the Federal Circuit, and on 
remand, the Federal Circuit will have the opportunity to revisit the §271 (a) question if it so chooses.」
74　Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 786 F.3d 899 (2015)
75　原文該当箇所「In the court’s view, and for the reasons set forth in more detail, infra, direct infringement liability of a method 
claim under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) exists when all of the steps of the claim are performed by or attributed to a single entity̶as would 
be the case, for example, in a principal-agent relationship, in a contractual arrangement, or in a joint enterprise. Because this case 
involves neither agency nor contract nor joint enterprise, we find that Limelight is not liable for direct infringement. …（中略）… In 
the present case, the asserted claims were drafted so as to require the activities of both Limelight and its customers for a finding of 
infringement. Thus, Akamai put itself in a position of having to show that the allegedly infringing activities of Limelight’s customers 
were attributable to Limelight. Akamai did not meet this burden because it did not show that Limelight’s customers were acting as 
agents of or otherwise contractually obligated to Limelight or that they were acting in a joint enterprise when performing the tagging 
and serving steps. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of Limelight’s motion for JMOL of non-infringement under § 271 
(a).」
76　Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020 (2015)
77　原文該当箇所「Direct infringement under § 271 (a) occurs where all steps of a claimed method are performed by or attributable 
to a single entity. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Where more than one actor is 
involved in practicing the steps, a court must determine whether the acts of one are attributable to the other such that a single entity is 
responsible for the infringement. We will hold an entity responsible for others’ performance of method steps in two sets of 
circumstances： (1) where that entity directs or controls others’ performance, and (2) where the actors form a joint enterprise.」

























vicarious liability. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1379. In the past, we have held that an actor is liable for infringement under § 271(a) if it 
acts through an agent (applying traditional agency principles) or contracts with another to perform one or more steps of a claimed 
method. See BMC, 498 F.3d at 1380-81. We conclude, on the facts of this case, that liability under § 271(a) can also be found when 
an alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented 
method and establishes the manner or timing of that performance. …（中略）… In those instances, the third party’s actions are 
attributed to the alleged infringer such that the alleged infringer becomes the single actor chargeable with direct infringement.」
79　原文該当箇所「Alternatively, where two or more actors form a joint enterprise, all can be charged with the acts of the other, 
rendering each liable for the steps performed by the other as if each is a single actor. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 491 cmt. b 
(“The law . . . considers that each is the agent or servant of the others, and that the act of any one within the scope of the enterprise is 
to be charged vicariously against the rest.”). A joint enterprise requires proof of four elements: 
　　(1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the group;
　　(2) a common purpose to be carried out by the group;
　　(3) a community of pecuniary interest in that purpose, among the members; and
　　(4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control.」






































　Akamai判決から約 1年半後の2017年 1 月に CAFC判決が出された Eli Lilly事件86は、抗癌剤の投与方法









83　原文該当箇所「The en banc court changed the result in the Akamai-Limelight case, now ruling against Limelight and for Akamai. 
Id. at 1025. The court did so by broadening the circumstances in which others’ acts may be attributed to an accused infringer to 
support direct-infringement liability for divided infringement, relaxing the tighter constraints on such attribution reflected in our 
earlier precedents and in the three previous rulings for Limelight on direct infringement.…（中略）… We need not say how much 
broadening occurred in Akamai IV. In the present cases, the district court’s rulings and the arguments of Fandango and Vivid Seats to 
the district court were squarely based on the earlier, narrower standard. We vacate the judgments on the pleadings against Mr. Mankes 
and remand for further proceedings in light of Akamai IV.」
84　Medgraph, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 843 F.3d 942（2016）
85　原文該当箇所「The evidence presented to the district court indisputably shows that Medtronic does not condition the use of, or 
receipt of a benefit from, the CareLink System on the performance of all of Medgraph’s method steps. For example, Medtronic does 
not deny users the ability to use CareLink Personal and CareLink Pro without performance of the claim step of ensuring detachment 
of the measuring device from the patient after each measurement.…（中略）… The evidence also shows that Medtronic freely permits 
using the CareLink System without performing synchronization, and it denies no benefit to such users for their choices to do so. J.A. 
1499, 1503. Patients can freely choose to bring their devices to their physician’s office and have their data extracted locally there. J.A. 
820-21, 967-68. Patients also can print or email reports and bring them to their medical practitioner. J.A. 907, 923.」













　Eli Lilly事件CAFC判決から約 1年後にはTravel Sentry事件92のCAFC判決も出されている。この事件は、
特殊ロックを用いた手荷物検査方法に関する特許権者である David A. Tropp氏（以下、「Tropp氏」という。）













87　原文該当箇所「In Akamai V, …（中略）… we observed that, “［i］n the future, other factual scenarios may arise which warrant 
attributing others’ performance of method steps to a single actor. Going forward, principles of attribution are to be considered in the 
context of the particular facts presented.”」
88　原文該当箇所「In Akamai V, we found “conditioning” based on evidence that the defendant required all of its customers to sign a 
standard contract delineating the steps that customers had to perform to use the defendant’s service. 797 F.3d at 1024. But we did not 
limit “conditioning” to legal obligations or technological prerequisites. We cautioned that “principles of attribution are to be 
considered in the context of the particular facts presented” and even expressly held that § 271 (a) infringement “is not limited solely 
to principal-agent relationships, contractual arrangements, and joint enterprise.”」
89　原文該当箇所「We therefore see no reversible error in the district court’s finding that physicians condition patient participation in 
an activity or receipt of a benefit (pemetrexed treatment) on folic acid administration and also establish the manner or timing of 
performance.」
90　原 文 該 当 箇 所「To show inducement, Eli Lilly carries the burden of further proving “specific intent and action to induce 
infringement.…（中略）… Depending on the clarity of the instructions, the decision to continue seeking FDA approval of those 
instructions may be sufficient evidence of specific intent to induce infringement.…（中略）… Again, the product labeling includes 
repeated instructions and warnings regarding the importance of and reasons for folic acid treatment, and there is testimony that the 
Physician Prescribing Information, as the name indicates, is directed at physicians. See J.A. 2181, 11253, 11255, 11256, 11258, 
11278. The instructions are unambiguous on their face and encourage or recommend infringement.…（中略）… In sum, evidence that 
the product labeling that Defendants seek would inevitably lead some physicians to infringe establishes the requisite intent for 
inducement. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that Defendants would induce infringement of the asserted claims of 
the ’209 patent.」
91　原文該当箇所「Our holding today does not assume that patient action is attributable to a prescribing physician solely because they 
have a physician-patient relationship. We leave to another day what other scenarios also satisfy the “direction or control” requirement. 
The two-prong test that we set forth in Akamai V is applicable to the facts of this case and resolves the existence of underlying direct 
infringement.」





　被告の Travel Sentry社も登録商標である赤いダイヤモンドのロゴを用いた TSAロックに関する事業を
行っており、特殊ロックに関するライセンス契約を複数のロック製造会社、ロック販売業者や旅行バック
製造会社と締結していた。






　CAFCは Akamai2要件テストを用い、証拠に基づき、Travel Sentry社が TSAによる本件特許発明の最後
の 2つのステップ（S3と S4）の実施を、TSAが Travel Sentry社のマークが付された手荷物を識別し、
Travel Sentry社から提供されたマスターキーを使って手荷物を解錠するという利益の条件としており93、か
つ、Travel Sentry社が本件特許発明の S3と S4の TSAによる実施の方法とタイミングを設定していた94と
述べ、第 1審における非侵害との判断は、TSAの受ける利益等についての誤った事実認定に基づくもの
であるとして、事件を地裁に差し戻した。
　条件とされる利益に関し、CAFCは、先の Akamai事件や Eli Lilly事件では享受する利益はサービス提
供者が課した行為と同一の広がりを持つものではなかったが、サービス提供者によって課された行為を実






93　原文該当箇所「We next consider whether a reasonable jury could conclude that Travel Sentry “conditions” TSA’s participation in 
the correctly defined activity or receipt of the correctly identified universe of benefits on TSA’s performance of the final two claim 
steps. We answer this question in the affirmative. Not only has Travel Sentry supplied TSA with passkeys and training that enable TSA 
to screen for its luggage, but the relevant “activity” is coextensive with the final two claim steps. …（中略）… Similarly, whatever 
benefits flow to TSA from identifying luggage with Travel Sentry’s dual-access locks and from opening these locks with the passkeys 
that Travel Sentry provided can only be realized if TSA performs the final two claim steps.」
94　原文該当箇所「We likewise conclude that, drawing all justifiable inferences in Tropp’s favor, a reasonable jury could find that 
Travel Sentry has established the manner or timing of TSA’s performance. It is undisputed that Travel Sentry entered into the MOU 
with TSA, provided TSA with passkeys and instructional materials on how to identify locks licensed with Travel Sentry’s trademark, 
and replaced passkeys. See Appellee Br. 5 n.3. The MOU sets forth the steps TSA would need to follow in order to use Travel Sentry’s 
standard and obtain the associated benefits. It is also undisputed that TSA has used Travel Sentry’s lock system. See J.A. 722-23. 
There is evidence in the record, moreover, that Travel Sentry established its identifying mark, owns and licenses the trademark to that 
mark, and controls the design of the locks and passkeys. Based on this evidence, a trier of fact could reason-ably find that Travel 
Sentry has established the manner of TSA’s performance of the third and fourth steps of Tropp’s independent method claims.」
95　原文該当箇所「In Akamai V̶and in Eli Lilly as well̶there was evidence in the record that individuals who desired the benefits 
of a particular service could be denied access to the service unless they satisfied certain conditions imposed by the service provider. 
The benefits these individuals were seeking, however, were not coextensive with the claim steps they were required to perform; rather, 
they could receive a benefit from the service provider after completion of these prerequisite steps. Here, by contrast, the benefits TSA 
allegedly seeks flow directly from its performance of the final two claim steps. This is because the very activity in which TSA seeks to 
participate is the very activity identified in the claim steps. …（中略）… We observed that, in Akamai V, “we did not limit 
’conditioning’ to legal obligations or technological prerequisites,” and recognized that the standard contract in that case “was not 
significant for imposing civil liability but for ’delineat［ing］ the steps’ that customers would have to perform ’if ［they］ wish［ed］ to 
use ［defendant’s］ product.’” Id. at 1367 & n.5 (quoting Akamai V, 797 F.3d at 1024). Here, too, it is irrelevant that TSA can choose 
to accomplish its luggage screening mandate through other means. What is critical is that TSA must perform the final two claim steps 
if it wishes to participate in the activity of screening luggage bearing Travel Sentry certified locks by opening such locks with the 
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た Uniloc事件（Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292（2011））、（ 2）ファイル転送システムに関し、ユーザに
よる当該システムの使用による直接侵害の成否判断において、ユーザが享受する利益が主な争点の 1つとなった





























使用による直接侵害の成否が問題となった Grecia事件（Grecia v. McDonald’s Corp., 724 Fed. Appx. 942（2018））、（ 4）複
数車両互換制御システムに関し、ユーザによる直接侵害の成立が認められた場合において、当該システムの主要部分を
販売する被告の誘引侵害の成否判断において、被告の主観的要件が主な争点の 1つとなった Omega Patents事件（Omega 
Patents, LLC v. CalAmp Corp., 920 F.3d 1337（2019））などがある。Centillion事件より後の事件である上記（ 2）から（ 4）
の事件では全ての事件において Centillion事件 CAFC判決が引用されている。
100　NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282（2005） 本事件は電子メールシステムと無線ネットワークシステムを
統合し、受信した電子メールを携帯無線端末に配信するシステムに関する特許（米国特許第5436960号）を有する NTP, 









101　原文該当箇所「The “control” contemplated in NTP is the ability to place the system as a whole into service. In other words, the 
customer in NTP remotely “controlled” the system by simply transmitting a message. 418 F.3d at 1317. That customer clearly did not 
have possession of each of the relays in the system, nor did it exert the level of direct, physical “control” that the district court 
requires. To accept the district court’s interpretation of “use” would effectively overturn NTP because the predicate “use” in that case 
would no longer fall under the definition of “use.” …（中略）… It did not matter that the user did not have physical control over the 
relays, the user made them work for ［**12］ their patented purpose, and thus “used” every element of the system by putting every 
element collectively into service.」
102　CAFCは本事件（Centillion事件）より後の Intellectual Ventures I事件（Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Motorola Mobility 





















証明しないといけない（原文該当箇所「In an analysis of a system claim under Centillion, proof of an infringing “use” of the 
claimed system under § 271（a） requires the patentee to demonstrate that the direct infringer obtained “benefit” from each and every 
element of the claimed system.」）との考えを示している。この考えに基づけば、一部の構成要件が生み出す利益が被告に
よって享受されていない場合には直接侵害は成立しないこととなる。
103　原文該当箇所「We hold that the on-demand operation is a “use” of the system as a matter of law. 1 The customer puts the system 
as a whole into service, i.e., controls the system and obtains benefit from it. The customer controls the system by creating a query and 
transmitting it to Qwest’s back-end. The customer controls the system on a one request/one response basis. This query causes the 
back-end processing to act for its intended purpose to run a query and return a result. The user may then download the result and 
perform additional processing as required by the claim. If the user did not make the request, then the back-end processing would not 
be put into service. By causing the system as a whole to perform this processing and obtaining the benefit of the result, the customer 
has “used” the system under § 271 (a). It makes no difference that the back-end processing is physically possessed by Qwest. The 
customer is a single “user” of the system and because there is a single user, there is no need for the vicarious liability analysis from 
BMC or Cross Medical.」
104　原文該当箇所「We also hold that the standard operation is a “use” as a matter of law. The standard operation allows users to 
subscribe to receive electronic billing information on a monthly basis. Once a user subscribes, Qwest’s backend system generates 
monthly reports and makes them available to the customer by download or other means. Qwest also makes available to customers 
software to load on their PCs to further exploit these monthly reports. Unlike the on-demand operation, this is not a one request/one 
response scenario. By subscribing a single time, the user causes the back-end processing to perform its function on a monthly basis. 
Like the on-demand operation, the back-end processing in normal operation is performed in response to a customer demand. The 
difference though is that a single customer demand (the act of subscribing to the service) causes the back-end processing monthly. But 
in both modes of operation, it is the customer initiated demand for the service which causes the back-end system to generate the 
requisite reports. This is “use” because,
but for the customer’s actions, the entire system would never have been put into service. This is sufficient control over the system under 
NTP, and the customer clearly benefits from this function.」
105　原文該当箇所「Because the issue has not been raised on appeal here, we make no comment on whether Qwest may have induced 
infringement by a customer.」
106　原文該当箇所「We agree with Qwest that, as a matter of law, it does not “use” the patented invention under the appropriate test 
from NTP. To “use” the system, Qwest must put the claimed invention into service, i.e., control the system and obtain benefit from it. 
NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317. While Qwest may make the back-end processing elements, it never “uses” the entire claimed system because it 
never puts into service the personal computer data processing means. Supplying the software for the customer to use is not the same 
as using the system.」
107　原文該当箇所「Following our vicarious liability precedents, we conclude, as a matter of law, that Qwest is not vicariously liable 
for the actions of its customers. Qwest in no way directs its customers to perform nor do its customers act as its agents. While Qwest 
provides software and technical assistance, it is entirely the decision of the customer whether to install and operate this software on its 































侵害が成立する範囲を拡大するために Akamai2要件テストという規範を作り上げた。そして、上記 3（ 1）
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